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Esan v.The Attorney General
(Appeal No. 96/2014) [2016] ZMSC 255
Nicholas Kahn-Fogel
The Facts
The Appellant, a British national, was the chief executive of Lafarge, SouthEast Africa. He obtained a two-year work permit effective from February of
2012. On December 3 2012, Zambian immigration officers detained the
Appellant at Kenneth Kaunda International Airport on his return from a trip
to Malawi. That evening, the Appellant was driven to Ndola. Officers
denied the Appellant’s request to stop at his home to collect medicine, and
they forbade him from using his telephone. On the trip to Ndola, the
Appellant first learned of the purpose of his detention when officers gave
him a document, signed by the Director General of Immigration, stating that
his employment permit had been revoked on the grounds that he was “likely
to be a danger to peace and good order in Zambia.”
The government planned to put the Appellant on a flight from Ndola to
Nairobi, but when the party arrived in Ndola, they learned that the flight had
been delayed. The government then decided to put the Appellant on a flight
to Johannesburg the following afternoon. While officers escorted him to that
flight, they handed him a “Notice of Prohibited Immigrant to leave
Zambia”. The notice, which was stamped 5 December 2012, informed the
Appellant that he was a prohibited immigrant because his permit to remain
in the country had expired or been revoked, and because the Minister of
Home Affairs had declared in writing that his presence in Zambia was
inimical to the public interest. The document was signed by an immigration
officer, but not by the Minister.
Procedural Posture
After the Appellant unsuccessfully appealed to the Minister of Home
Affairs to return to work pending a long-term settlement, the Appellant
sought relief in the High Court on the ground that the Director General’s
revocation of his work permit had been procedurally improper and
irrational. Specifically, the Appellant argued that the Director General had
failed to comply with Section 10 of the Immigration and Deportation Act,
which requires the government to give at least forty-eight hours of notice,
the reasons for the decision, and an opportunity to be heard to anyone
adversely affected by an immigration decision, except for decisions relating
to deportation and removal. This provision required the government to give
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the Appellant such notice and the opportunity to be heard before revoking
his work permit. The High Court condemned the government’s treatment of
the Appellant and agreed that the Director General’s failure to provide the
Appellant with forty-eight hours of notice and an opportunity to be heard,
along with the reasons for the decision, before the revocation of his work
permit, violated the Appellant’s rights under the Act. However, the High
Court denied relief to the Appellant because it found the Minister’s
declaration that Appellant’s presence in Zambia was inimical to the public
interest superseded the violation by the Director General. Because the Act
permits the Minister to make such decisions without explaining his reasons,
and without requiring notice and an opportunity to be heard, the court held
that the Appellant would have been subject to deportation even in the
absence of the Director General’s actions. The Court noted that the
Appellant could seek relief for his mistreatment using other processes of
law, but that he was not entitled to an order quashing the decision of the
Minister ordering him to leave Zambia.
Issues on Appeal
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the Appellant argued that; 1) the trial judge erred
by finding the Director General’s revocation of the Appellant’s work permit was
void for lack of the required notice, but then holding there was no nexus between
that decision and the Minister’s “Notice to Prohibited Immigrant to Leave
Zambia”; 2) that the trial judge had erred in holding that ordering relief against the
Director General would serve no purpose, notwithstanding the breach in
procedure; and 3) that the trial judge erred by abdicating his responsibility to
adjudicate all issues in controversy when he opined that the Appellant could use
“other processes of law” to seek redress for his mistreatment.
The Holding
The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s upholding of the Minister’s
decision, ruling that the removal of the Appellant from Zambia was unlawful.
The crux of the Court’s holding was that, although the Immigration and
Deportation Act permits the Minister of Home Affairs to declare a person’s
presence in Zambia inimical to the public interest and to deport the person
without explaining his reasons and without notice or an opportunity to be heard
in advance, Section 35(2) of the Act requires the Minister to issue any such
declaration in writing. Although an immigration officer had signed the “Notice
of Prohibited Immigrant to Leave Zambia” that the Appellant received as he
was escorted to his airplane, there was no document in evidence showing that
the Minister himself had ever declared in writing that the Appellant’s presence
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in Zambia was inimical to the public interest. Thus, there was no lawful
declaration by the Minister that could have superseded the Director General’s
violation of Appellant’s statutory rights.
The Court’s interpretation of the Act could have dispensed with the case on
straightforward statutory grounds. The Court elaborated on its decision,
however, by noting that the affront to the Appellant’s human rights, along
with the potential for arbitrariness created by the Minister’s unfettered
statutory discretion to declare a person’s presence inimical to the public
interest, without even the requirement to articulate reasons for doing so, led
the court to interpret the statute strictly. The Court repeatedly went beyond
mere mechanical application of the statute to suggest its willingness to protect
individual rights against government excess. The Court noted, for example,
that despite the seemingly absolute discretion the statute conferred on the
Minister, “Courts ought to be conscious of emerging trends towards a more
open and transparent government that promote the rule of law, human rights
and curb arbitrariness.” Therefore, a court “should go behind the orders and
delve into the circumstances in which the power was exercised especially
where there is prima facie evidence of arbitrariness or perverse actions, to
ensure that it was exercised lawfully and within the confines of the law.”
The Supreme Court went on to assert that, given the sequence of events and
the inhumane treatment of the Appellant, the trial court should have
“imputed bad faith and unreasonable exercise of power on the part of
immigration authorities and granted the order of certiorari.” This finding
supported the Court’s conclusion that there was, in fact, a nexus between
the revocation of the Appellant’s work permit in violation of the Act and the
“Notice to Prohibited Immigrant to Leave Zambia”, which invoked the
Minister’s declaration that the Appellant’s presence in Zambia was inimical
to the public interest. As the Court noted, the two documents were issued
“more or less at the same time,” and the revocation of the permit triggered
the chain of events.
Given the Court’s finding that the government simply had not complied
with the statute with regard to either the revocation of the permit or the
Minister’s declaration, the Court’s identification of a nexus between the two
decisions may have been unnecessary to its holding. It is unnecessary to
conclude that illegitimate government conduct was causally related to an
ostensibly valid, subsequent government act, if the subsequent act is
illegitimate on its own terms. To use the terminology of American criminal
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procedure, there is no need to characterize conduct as fruit of a poisonous
tree if the conduct in question is poisonous in its own right. Here, because
the government failed to comply with the requirement that the Minister
provide a written declaration that the Appellant’s presence in Zambia was
inimical to the public interest, there was no legitimate basis for deporting
the Appellant that could have superseded the violation of his right to notice
of the revocation of his work permit and, consequently, no need to
demonstrate a nexus between the two decisions.
While the Court took issue with the manner in which the Appellant
formulated his second argument, and while it noted that his third argument
was inapt in that the Appellant did not seek any alternative relief in the High
Court, the Supreme Court’s ultimate conclusion gave the Appellant the
relief he sought.
Significance
The Court’s holding provides welcome evidence of judicial independence
and willingness to uphold individual rights and the rule of law against
executive arbitrariness and excess. The opinion is impressive as well in its
at times majestic description of the importance of exercising judicial power
as a check on human rights abuses. As noted, the essence of the Court’s
decision rested on what could have been characterized as a fairly mundane
application of a clearly delineated statutory requirement; although the
Minister of Home Affairs has statutory discretion to declare anyone’s
presence in the country inimical to the public interest without notice or
articulation of the reasons for the decision, the statute requires that the
Minister make such a declaration in writing, and he did not do so in this
case. It has long been recognized that legal directives formulated as
precisely delineated rules can insulate judges against threats to their
independence, for such directives leave the decision-maker with little
discretion or room for manipulation. Yet the Court declined to rely only on
a dry application of the statute to the facts. Instead, it clearly and
courageously asserted its important role in protecting the human rights of all
people in Zambia.
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